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ABSTRACT
Transportation options provide the buyer the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell transporta-
tion capacity at a future date.  These options can provide shippers, carriers and logistics companies a
significant opportunity to reduce risks and increase capacity flexibility.  This paper summarizes some
of these benefits, describes a number of issues to be resolved before trading transportation options
can become a reality, and presents possible resolutions for these issues.
INTRODUCTION
In 2006, Tibben-Lembke and Rogers presented
the concept of transportation options, a new tool
for providing flexibility for supply chain manag-
ers.  Despite the fact that transportation options
are not currently traded, this proposed concept
has already been discussed in the supply chain
press (Lynch, 2007).  Firms have begun looking
to hedge their transportation risk, and since
financial derivatives are utilized to ameliorate
the risk of physical commodities, we believe
applying them to transportation could provide
managers an additional tool to manage costs.
As described in detail below, transportation
options would be quite similar in many ways to
stock options and other financial derivatives.  A
primary function of financial derivatives is for
one party to pay another participant to assume
some risk.  Transportation options would work
similarly to stock options in this regard.  For
example, if a shipper bought an option to ship an
item at a future date for a given price, they have
eliminated the risk of needing to pay a higher
price for that transportation at the time of the
transaction.  In exchange for the payment they
receive, the option seller agrees to accept the risk
of price increases, because the seller believes
that the price will not rise to the extent that the
purchaser of the option believes is likely.  Given
the sources of uncertainty companies face
(access to capacity, fuel prices, driver shortages,
etc., etc.), and the possibility for options to
reduce these risks, we believe using options to
hedge transportation costs could provide signifi-
cant opportunities for parties at all stages of the
supply chain: shippers, carriers, and 3PLs.
Although we will refer to the provider of the
transportation service as a “carrier,” we believe
that transportation options could potentially be
written for any transportation modes such as
truck, ocean, air, rail, pipeline, or power line.
Additionally, the transportation provider could
be a non-asset-based third party such as an
NVOCC.
In fact, some forms of options have been traded
on ocean shipping capacity since 1985 (Gray,
1987, Alizadeh and Nomikos, 2009), when the
Baltic International Freight Futures Exchange
(BIFFEX) futures contracts were created, trading
on the 13 routes defined in the Baltic Freight
Index (BFI).  Multiple sizes of ships and types of
cargoes are now included.  The statistical rela-
tionships between the lanes and cargo types have
been widely studied (Haigh et al..,2004,
Nomikos and Alizadeh, 2002).  These indices
have allowed shippers and carriers to manage
their risks and have found acceptance in the
ocean shipping world.  We believe that a method
for hedging and managing other types of trans-
portation risk could provide similar benefits.
Below, we address many of the issues that must
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be considered before transportation options can
be widely traded, present possible solutions for
many of these issues, and provide a list of areas
where future work is still needed.
HOW TRANSPORTATION OPTIONS
COULD WORK
A transportation option would be similar to a
stock option, and like a stock option, could come
in the form of both “puts” and “calls.”  For
stocks, a call option allows the purchaser to buy
the stock at the specified price, which is called
the “strike price.”  This strike price means the
investor will be able to purchase the stock at a
guaranteed price.  Between the time that the
option is purchased and the exercise or strike
date, the market price may rise above the strike
price, in which case the option will be exercised
because the investor can buy the stock more
cheaply than the market price and immediately
sell it at a profit, or fall below the strike price, in
which case the option will not be exercised.  In
either case, the option allows the manager to
reduce the uncertainty of future returns.  If the
option may be exercised at any time prior to the
exercise date, it is known as an “American”
option, and if it may only be exercised on the
specified date, it is known as a “European”
option (Kolb and Overdahl, 2007).
A transportation call option would give the
shipper the right to ship a given quantity on a
specific lane on a given date in the future.  If
shippers are uncertain about the ability to get
access to transportation capacity in the future, or
would like to lock in transportation prices for the
future, they might be interested in purchasing
call options.  With a truckload (TL) call option,
if the shipper decides against exercising the
option, the carrier does not send the truck.  This
is analogous to the case of the stock option: if
the buyer of the stock option decides not to
exercise the option, the option seller keeps
possession of the stock.
As shown in Figure 1, if a shipper buys a call
option, and the market price goes above the
strike price, the shipper will never pay a price
higher than the strike price, protecting the
shipper from upward price movements.  The
heavy line in Figure 1 depicts the price the
shipper would pay.  If the market price exceeds
the strike price, the shipper would only pay the
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strike price of the call option.  At the same time,
the call option seller (also called the “writer”) is
now guaranteed that it will never see revenues
greater than the strike price.
A put option on a stock gives the holder the
right, but not the obligation, to compel the seller
of the option to take possession of the asset and
pay the specified price.  A put option would give
the carrier the right to haul a shipment on a
particular date.  In a transportation option, a put
option would be similar, in that the holder of the
put option would have the right to compel the
option’s seller to take temporary possession of
the asset and pay the specified price.
BENEFITS OF TRANSPORTATION
OPTIONS
Transportation options can provide a number of
different kinds of benefits for all of the partici-
pants in the transportation marketplace.  Both
shippers and transportation providers face
uncertainties that could be hedged through the
utilization of options.  These risks include
problems such as increasing or decreasing fuel
costs.  Options could ameliorate risks such as
capacity problems that happen during the period
leading up to the Christmas season.  Long term
negotiated contracts with carriers that can be
locked in for heavy freight lanes are useful to
manage uncertainty, but contracts with carriers
often include volume requirements or implied
freight levels to receive the negotiated pricing.
Options would be useful for both heavy freight
lanes and for lower volume and less repetitive
moves.  If a driver or equipment shortage
develops, or threat of a strike similar to the one
that UPS faced in 1997 (Brannigan and
Mathews, 1997), using options could allow
shippers a steady supply of transportation
capacity.
Removing Sources of Risk
There are many sources of uncertainty for ship
pers, carriers, and third party logistics service
companies whose risk could be reduced through
the use of options. For example:
• Access to capacity in tight markets or lanes due
to seasonal fluctuations (e.g. pre-holiday ship-
ments)
• Access to capacity in tight markets or lanes due
to cyclical fluctuations (e.g. driver shortages)
• Fuel price risks
• Economic fluctuations (e.g. a booming
economy means all transportation capacity is
tight)
• Equipment positioning imbalances (e.g. due to
product flows, equipment is available in a loca-
tion but is unavailable where it is required)
In 2006 through 2008, there were numerous
reports of a tight supply for truck drivers in the
U.S. and Europe (Ajlouny, 2006; Lynch, 2006).
As the price of diesel spiked in the summer of
2008, and the economy slowed later in that same
year, a large number of trucks were taken out of
service and shipped to places such as Eastern
Europe (Calabrese, 2008).  As the economy
continues to recover, there may be capacity
issues.  In Europe, new laws mandating the
tracking and monitoring of driver behavior are
expected to further tighten the supply of drivers
(Zuckerman, 2008).  When transportation capac-
ity is tight, costs could be expected to rise, and if
options can provide an ability to reduce the risk
of paying higher shipping costs, they should be
quite attractive for shippers.
In the summer of 2007, a U.S. consumer goods
company paid a large 3PL above-market rates in
order to have guaranteed access to transportation
capacity before a major holiday.  The shipper
paid the full above-market price, regardless of
whether it used the capacity or not.  If the shipper
would have had the choice to just buy an option
for that capacity, it would have been much better
off: it would have had the same guaranteed
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access to capacity, but at a much lower cost
(Sanders, 2010).
One large source of uncertainty for supply chain
firms is uncertainty in fuel prices. In recent
years, the price of fuel has varied significantly.
Although carriers have some ability to protect
themselves through the use of fuel surcharges,
shippers have no such ability, and call options
could protect them from the risk of rising prices.
By buying a call option, the shipper ensures that
it will never pay a higher price for the capacity
than the strike price of the option.  Figure 2
shows the fluctuation in prices for No. 2 diesel
fuel over the past 20 years from March of 1994
through February of 2014 (EIA, 2014).
Although prices have climbed steadily over this
time period, there has been a significant amount
of short-term fluctuation within that period, as
well.  Figure 3 shows how much prices changed
over a rolling four week period.  For example, in
September, 2005, diesel prices were 20% higher
than they had been just four weeks earlier.  Then,
in November, prices fell 20% compared with
where than they had been just four weeks prior.
Clearly, fuel prices can change significantly in a
short period of time.
U.S. economic variability can be a source of
significant fluctuations in the price and availabil-
ity of transportation capacity.  As U.S. demand
for goods manufactured overseas has increased
over recent decades, access to transportation
capacity has become an increasingly critical
resource for retailers, distributors and manufac-
turers.  Cyclical increases and decreases in the
U.S. economy can have a significant impact on
the demand for transportation capacity.  In 2007
and 2008, the declining value of the U.S. dollar
increased U.S. exports (New York Times, 2008).
Financial Benefit of Call Options
For Both Parties
In order for options to be traded, they have to be
attractive to both carriers and shippers.  As
discussed above, a call option allows shippers to
purchase the benefit of not worrying about
transportation costs increasing beyond the strike
price.  Regardless of whether they use the option
or not, they benefit from its existence.
A call option also has to benefit the carrier.  If
the value of the premium from selling a call
option is enough to stimulate the carrier to sell,
then the option will be perceived to be profit-
able.  Consider, for example, a single-driver load
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from the Port of Los Angeles to Chicago.  In
early March 2014, a spot-market quote for two
weeks in advance was $3,179 (Freightquote,
2014).  For the carrier, suppose gross margins
are 10%.  So the carrier's costs for the shipment
would be $2,861 and gross profit is $318.  If the
shipper bought the option from the carrier for
$75, that would be a 24% increase in the carrier's
gross profits from the shipment.  Even if the
shipper does not use the truck, the carrier keeps
the $75 payment.  The lower the carrier’s mar-
gin, the greater the percentage increase in profits
from the option premium.  For example, if the
carrier’s margins were 5%, ($159), the $75
option premium would represent a 47% increase
in profits for the carrier.
If the spot market price rises to above $3,179,
the shipper would exercise the option.  If the
spot market price is $3,254, the carrier’s rev-
enues are the same as if there had been no
option, receiving  a payment of $3,179 for the
shipment, plus the $75 option fee, and still
makes its profits $318.  If the market price rises
above $3,254, the carrier receives less profit
from having sold the option than it would have if
it had not sold the option.  If the market price has
increased because of supply imbalances or short-
term driver shortages, the carrier’s costs (of
$2,861) would likely not increase, and the
carrier’s original profit of $318 remains intact.
If the carrier’s costs have not increased signifi-
cantly, the carrier’s profit is unchanged by the
rising market price, because the revenues and
costs are unchanged.  If the price rises higher,
the carrier is not making as much profit as it
could make at the market price, but is still
making the profits of $318.
However, this is less profit than the carrier
would receive from carrying the load at the
higher market price, but the original profit has
not been forfeited.  If fuel or labor costs in-
crease, the carrier’s costs must increase above
$3,254 before the carrier will actually lose
money by carrying the load for $3,179.  That
would be a cost increase of $393, almost 14%.
PRICING TRANSPORTATION OPTIONS
Deciding on the price for buying or selling an
option is clearly important.  Sophisticated
models would be required, based on historical
data and economic projections, to figure out how
much a company should be willing to pay for an
option.
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In a way, transportation options are like an
insurance policy a shipper can buy to guarantee
the price to be paid will not exceed a given
value.  With insurance, companies charge a
premium to take on risk for the company.  The
premium is set at a point where the policyholder
feels the benefit in reduced risk exceeds the
premium, and yet at a point that the insurance
company can make a profit by pooling the risk
of insuring a large number of policies.  In much
the same way that the actuarial field has been
developed to set insurance premiums, and
options pricing models have been developed to
set premiums for stock options, a mathematical
study of transportation options pricing is also
required.
In the stock exchanges and commodities mar-
kets, derivatives have been successful.  The
primary reason for their success is that they have
attracted many different types of traders, and
they increase liquidity in the market.  The trader
can control a large amount of stock with a
minimal stake.  When a trader wants to take one
side of an options contract, there is usually no
problem finding another trader that is willing to
take the other side.
USING PUT OPTIONS
In a stock transaction, a put option gives the
holder the right, but not the obligation, to require
someone to take possession of the asset and pay
the specified price for the asset.  If the price of a
stock falls below the strike price, the option
holder would exercise the option, forcing the
option seller to buy the stock at the above-
market strike price.  In a transportation option, a
put option would be similar, in that the holder of
the put option would have the right to require the
put option’s seller to take temporary possession
of the asset and pay the specified price.
For example, suppose a shipper sells a put
option to a carrier to move a load on a given lane
for $1,500, and suppose the carrier pays $100 to
the shipper for this option.  This gives the carrier
the right to require the shipper to use the
carrier’s trucks at that price.  Suppose the spot
market price for the lane is $1,300 on the
option’s strike date.  The carrier would decide to
exercise the put option, which means that the
shipper is obligated to use the truck on the lane
and pay $1,500 to the carrier.  If the spot market
price were above $1,500, the carrier would not
exercise the put option, because the carrier can
receive a higher payment on the spot market.
This guarantees the carrier a revenue stream,
which is why it would buy a put.  From the
shipper’s perspective, if the spot market price is
below $1,500, the shipper will be forced to pay
above-market rates for the lane, because it sold
this put option.
The shipper is essentially selling an insurance
policy to the carrier, protecting the carrier
against the possibility of rates being too low.
The shipper must carefully consider its beliefs
about future prices, in order to properly put a
price on how much it wants to receive in order to
be willing to sell the put option.  If a shipper
thinks there is a realistic possibility that the
market price will not be below $1,500, the
shipper should consider the possibility of selling
a put option.
If the carrier thinks that fluctuations in demand
for trucks on the lane and fluctuations in the
price of fuel make it a realistic possibility that
the spot market price might be below $1,500, the
carrier should consider the possibility of buying
the put option.  The amount the carrier would be
willing to pay for this risk protection will depend
on its tolerance for risk, and its beliefs about
future prices.
Another reason for using put options is to bound
the risk realized by a call option.  As depicted in
Figure 4, if a carrier or 3PL sells call options to
shippers, it places a cap on the highest price it
can expect to receive for that service.  If a carrier
or 3PL buys a put option that places a lower
bound on the price that it will receive.  In Figure
4, both the upper and lower bounds provided by
a call option and a put option are shown.
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Thus, carriers or third parties have a reason to
consider buying a put option, and shippers have
a reason to consider selling a put option.  For
both, the put option represents a type of insur-
ance policy, or hedge, protecting the firm against
unfavorable prices in the spot market.  In order
for a transaction to take place, the amount of
protection offered must be sold for a price both
think represents a fair price.
OPPORTUNITIES FOR 3PLS
Many transportation transactions are facilitated
through a non-asset based third party logistics
provider (3PL).  A put option would work well
with a 3PL positioned in between the shipper
and the carrier.   One of the duties of the third-
party is to match and consolidate supply and
demand for capacity, charging a commission for
the service.  If transportation options became a
reality, the 3PL could benefit by selling financial
derivatives to both sides in addition to transpor-
tation and logistics services.
To some extent, a logistics third-party acts
similarly to a stockbroker: a stockbroker advises
clients on which investments to make and when,
and the 3PL advises shippers about which
carriers to use and when.  A 3PL may also act
like a stockbroker by suggesting opportunities,
providing predictions about the future state of
the market, and helping the client firm decide
when to lock in long-term pricing.
A 3PL could guarantee lower maximum prices
for its shippers by buying call options from its
carriers.  If one particular shipper does not need
the capacity, perhaps one of the many other
shippers will.  Similarly, it could sell put options
to its carriers.  When the carriers don’t exercise
the puts, it can bank the premiums.  When the
carriers do use the puts, it can use the premiums
to offset the higher rates.
In the current environment, when a 3PL is
responding to a bid, it has to tell the customer
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that it has no way to know for sure what the
prices are going to be in the future.  Typically, a
third party or a carrier will write a contract that
allows them to place transportation surcharges
on the shipper.  If the 3PL could buy or sell
options, it would be more able to protect both its
customer and its transportation supplier.  By
buying call options, the 3PL could offer its
customers guaranteed freight rates, which would
be a competitive advantage.  Currently, 3PLs are
often on “both sides of the table,” buying and
selling transportation capacity.  3PLs might find
options a valuable way to reduce the risk expo-
sure to customers, suppliers and themselves.  On
the other hand, a 3PL may believe that it has
sufficient capacity reserves to be able to absorb
the market risks of other companies, and it may
choose to sell options.
POSSIBLE RISKS OF FINANCIAL
DERIVATIVES
Because much of the credit crisis of 2008 was
related to financial derivatives, description of the
potential risks of transportation options is in
order.  Also, because there was widespread
belief that speculators had significantly affected
the price of oil, we will attempt to address the
possibilities for transportation options to be
similarly affected by speculation.
First of all, the authors do not believe that
transportation options will provide any signifi-
cant risk to the transportation markets.  Much of
the “subprime meltdown” of 2007 and “credit
crunch” was exacerbated by the heavy use of
complicated risk derivatives in the financial
markets (Mizen, 2008).  The use of securities
derived from mortgages became widely accepted
in capital markets, and produced high returns.
To meet this need, mortgage professionals
actively sought customers of lower and lower
creditworthiness, (because all of the better
credit-risk individuals already had mortgages).
Based on traditional mortgage default percent-
ages, brokers and financial professionals felt that
the risk of default was quite low, which is what
made them so attractive to investors.   Unfortu-
nately, these least-qualified buyers were going to
prove to default in much higher numbers than
predicted.  Also, the mortgage-generating institu-
tions were not concerned with the riskiness of
the loans, because they were going to sell the
loans off to be repackaged, so they would not
bear the risk of the loans (Mizen, 2008).
Thus, the risk from mortgage derivatives came
from loaning money to people that were poor
credit risks, because of an inaccurate assessment
of those risks.  Because transportation options
will not be based on loaning anyone money, the
types of problems experienced during the US
credit crisis would not seem to be a likely risk
for transportation options.
There are two conclusions for us to draw from
the credit crisis, however.  First, it illustrates that
financial professionals are ready to participate
heavily in any industry where they believe
financial gain may be made by carefully weigh-
ing financial risks and returns.  Second, when
evaluating risks, it is absolutely imperative that
the data being used be truly representative of the
risks being considered.  Another likely outcome
of the subprime credit crisis and the more recent
LIBOR scandal is that financial derivatives are
likely to become more heavily regulated and
placed under greater scrutiny.  As a result,
additional emphasis must be placed on transpar-
ency and accountability as we work toward
developing transportation derivatives.
We believe that the problems encountered with
mortgage-backed securities are unlikely to occur
with transportation options.  With transportation
options, a problem would show up more quickly.
If you had hired a bad carrier the feedback from
that would be quicker, and no more transactions
with that carrier would be created.
Speculation
Speculators’ only interest in the underlying
product is its price fluctuation and trying to
guess its future direction; they have no need for
the actual good.  Speculators “play an important
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role in the market by providing the liquidity that
makes hedging possible and assuming the risk
that hedgers are trying to eliminate” (Chance and
Brooks, 2007).  They provide liquidity by step-
ping in to buy when there are no other interested
parties available.  For those speculators, at the
strike date, there is no need for the actual prod-
uct or instrument to change hands: an exchange
of money equal to the difference in value is
sufficient.  Such products are “cash settled.”
However, in the case of transportation options,
the whole reason companies are interested in the
options is to hedge the risk of transportation
costs.  If capacity is scarce, the call option holder
may not be satisfied to receive a payment for the
difference between the strike price and the
current spot-market price.  What they really need
and want is the transportation capacity at the
negotiated price.  However, if a more centralized
spot market existed, and the shipper felt confi-
dent that it would, in fact, be able to purchase
the capacity at the spot market price, the shipper
should be willing to accept a cash-settled pay-
ment.
Dangers of Options
Options can be very useful instruments. They
can be utilized for hedging, speculation, and
arbitrage.  They also have inherent dangers built
into them.  Sometimes traders who are supposed
to hedge risks can follow an arbitrage strategy
that becomes irresponsible speculation.  The
results of such speculation can be disastrous.
Nick Leeson at Barings Bank in Singapore
provides an example of this.  Mr. Leeson, was an
employee of the Singapore office in 1995, and
was looking for arbitrage opportunities between
the Nikkei 225 futures prices on the Singapore
Exchange and those on the Osaka Exchange
(Hull, 2008).  As he began to speculate, he
incurred losses which he was able to hide at first.
He then took larger speculative positions to
recover the huge losses, but in the end only
made the losses worse.  The total loss was close
to $1 billion.  As a result, Barings Bank, which
had operated successfully for 200 years, was put
out of business.
Firms must use options carefully and be utilized
to hedge risk wisely.  Firms could use options to
find arbitrage opportunities to reduce transporta-
tion cost.  Firms have to be careful that they do
not cross the line into highly risky market specu-
lation.
STANDARDIZING OPTIONS
An important factor that has made the Baltic Dry
Index possible was that ocean shipping routes
lend themselves very readily to standardized
lanes, given the small number of international
ports, as compared to the number of possible
origin and destination points for truckload
shipments.  In order for an active market in
options to exist, a standardized set of widely
traded options must be created.
Lanes
A set of key lanes could be determined that
would be broadly representative of the condi-
tions in the market, in the same way that the
S&P 500 or the Dow Jones Industrial Average is
widely watched in the stock market.  These lanes
should probably be some of the highest-volume
lanes, freight-wise, but also the ones with the
highest volume of options activity.  As options
trading around transportation has not yet begun,
it is not possible to know which lanes will
generate the most trading activity.  However, it
seems likely that the highest-volume freight
lanes, shipment-wise, may be among the most
actively traded.  Demand and supply on trans-
portation lanes are typically asymmetrical.  For
example, the cost of a truckload originating from
Reno, Nevada and delivered to Los Angeles,
California is different than the cost of a truck-
load moving from Los Angeles to Reno.  This is
because the demand for delivered freight is
greater in Los Angeles than it is in Reno.
Off-Lane Origins and Destinations
A convention should be developed regarding
how far off of a lane the origin or destination
may be for the shipment to still be considered in
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the lane.  For example, suppose an option from
Los Angeles to Chicago is going to be exercised
at a price of $3,000.  The distance is roughly
2,000 miles.  Suppose the shipper actually wants
a delivery made to Kenosha, Wisconsin, 65
miles north of Chicago:  Should it be allowed?
A convention for off-lane origins and destina-
tions could to be developed to facilitate option
settlement.  If a shipper bought a Port of Long
Beach to Detroit option, and wants to use it to
haul a load from the port to Lansing, Michigan
which is approximately 80 miles from Detroit,
an agreed upon settlement mechanism to account
for the extra distance would need to be devel-
oped.  Perhaps, this mechanism could be built
into the option.  For example, for shorter dis-
tances, under 500 miles, a maximum of 50
additional miles would be allowed, and for
longer distances, a percentage maximum could
be allowed.  Alternatively, perhaps off-lane
points of any distance should be allowed, but a
surcharge should be added, related to the dis-
tance from the lane to the point.
Cost for Off-Lane Points
If a shipper wants to exercise an option and send
the shipment from a slightly different source or
to a slightly different destination, it would seem
the shipper should pay an additional cost.  How
much additional should the shipper pay?  There
are several possibilities.  Consider the Los
Angeles to Kenosha example mentioned above.
• One solution would be to say that the exercise
price of the option is $3,000/2000 miles = $1.50/
mile, and the shipper must pay this additional
cost for the distance from Chicago to Kenosha
(65 miles):  $97.50.
• Perhaps the shipper should pay $195, twice the
cost of driving from Chicago to Kenosha, to
represent the deadhead miles the truck will incur
in getting back to Chicago to pick up another
load.
• Alternatively, the shipper could argue that
when driving from LA to Kenosha, taking the
shortest interstate routes, Kenosha is only 30
miles farther from LA than Chicago is.  Perhaps
the shipper should pay 30 miles of additional
distance, plus a 65 mile deadhead charge back to
Chicago, $142.50
At this point, it is not possible to predict which
of these policies will be put in place, but it
seems that the strongest arguments can be made
in favor of the last two policies.  Both compen-
sate the carrier for the extra mileage.  Shippers
would prefer the third option, carriers the second
one. Also notice that the same issue arises for
origin points which are not right at the specified
origin, and a similar policy will need to be
implemented for off-lane origins.
Arbitrage
It is important to note that these off-lane costs
are important for providing arbitrage opportuni-
ties.  Arbitrage is when someone finds an unex-
plained difference between the pricing of two
commodities, and takes advantage of the pricing
misalignment to profit.  As multiple parties
exploit the arbitrage opportunity, the price of the
under-priced asset goes up, and the price of the
over-priced asset goes down, and the arbitrage
opportunity ends.  In this way, the ability of
traders to take advantage of arbitrage opportuni-
ties is very important in maintaining the liquidity
of the markets.
Off-lane pricing provides for the possibility of
arbitrage in the following way.  Suppose the
price of LA-Chicago is high, and the price of
LA-Detroit is low.  A shipper could buy the LA-
Detroit lane, and pay the off-lane charges to send
the shipment to Chicago, and still be cheaper
than buying the LA-Chicago lane.  As more
shippers take advantage of this, the price of LA-
Chicago will fall, and LA-Detroit will increase,
until the prices are brought into alignment.
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Additional Stops
A related issue is whether additional stops along
the way may be requested.  If some mechanism
can be created to allow this possibility, it would
increase interest in the options.  In some way, the
shipper must agree to pay some additional cost
for additional stops.  This additional cost will
probably include:
• An additional cost for each additional stop
added to the route
• A cost proportional to the distance the stops
add onto the trip length
• A charge per hour required by the stop
At a minimum, the additional costs must be
sufficient to cover the carrier’s additional labor
and fuel costs generated by the stops.  Also, the
carrier probably would like to maximize the
number of loads it can move per week, and
would rather not make a lot of stops, and would
rather have the cost per stop to be rather high, to
serve as a disincentive for shippers to request a
lot of stops.  For that reason, the cost per mile
for the additional distance would likely be higher
than the cost per mile of the shipment overall.
Perhaps one of the formulas mentioned above
will be used.  However, it is likely that the cost
will be proportional to the total number of miles
added to the trip by the stops.  The charge for the
additional mileage may be some multiple of the
cost per mile of the rest of the trip, say 1.5 or 2
times the regular mileage charge.  If the shipper
is going to request any stops, those would likely
need to be specified at the time that the shipper
informs the carrier of the intent to use the option.
Timing
To further simplify the trading of common lanes,
a convention must be decided upon for the dates
of the options.  Carriers and shippers alike need
to have agreement on the windows when the
options can be used.  Again, the more standard-
ization that can be brought into the options
market, the more efficient the market should be.
Also, carriers and shippers do not want to have
to keep track of the differing conventions used
by different carriers, shippers, or marketplaces.
The whole point of transportation options is to
reduce uncertainty about future shipments for
carriers and shippers.  The options must provide
enough certainty about the timing of the ship-
ments in order to serve the needs of the shippers,
so they can rely on these shipments to meet their
needs.  Otherwise, there would be no incentive
for shippers to use them.
We propose that options be traded for each
calendar week of the year, where a week is
defined as 12:00 am Sunday to 11:59 pm Satur-
day ET.  For example, a shipper may buy a call
option for week 48, to have a guaranteed price
for last-minute deliveries before the end of the
Christmas selling season.
Another possibility would be that a shipper may
seek to purchase options good for any week in a
range of weeks, over a 4, 8, or 12 week period.
This would give a shipper much more flexibility,
but it would place a lot more uncertainty on the
carrier, making it much harder for the carrier to
plan for the future.  Given that the carrier is
accepting considerably more risk, these options
should carry a much higher risk premium.
Advance Notice (Strike Dates)
Standardization is also required for how much
notice the option holder must give before exer-
cising the option. There are several likely possi-
bilities:
• One way would be to say that the decision to
use or not use an option must be communicated
by 5:00 p.m. on Friday of the prior week, and at
that point, the day of the following week on
which the option is to be used must be specified,
but the final pickup time on that date can be
specified later.
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• Similarly, the shipper could be required to give
notice of intent to use the option by some time,
say 5:00 p.m. Friday, and that the actual time
(and location) of the shipment must be specified
at least 24 hours in advance.
• The final way these could be structured would
be to say that the option holder must give at least
so many hours of advance notice, perhaps 24
hours. This period of advance notice should be
sufficient to allow the carriers to have the neces-
sary equipment in place by the required time.
Some conventions will need to be determined
regarding other details of the shipments, for
example, regarding holidays.  Perhaps the
consensus will be that national holidays will be
blackout days on which the options cannot be
used.  Alternatively, they could be treated like
regular days, or a surcharge of some percentage,
or a fixed dollar surcharge will be added.
Non-Compliance Penalties
If a carrier promises to provide service to a call
option buyer, and it fails to deliver as promised,
the carrier must face some form of punishment,
and the same would hold for the seller of a put
option.  It would seem likely that this punish-
ment would include a significant financial
penalty for the event, and a long-term conse-
quence of being barred from participating in
trading either transportation options, or if the
trading is taking place on an established change
such as the Chicago Board Options Exchange,
being barred from participating in that exchange
in the future.  If the firm has too many non-
compliance events in a given period of time,
SEC involvement may be required.  At a mini-
mum, the financial penalty needs to be large
enough that no carrier would decide to abandon
its obligation, because abandoning it would be
cheaper than fulfilling it.  The penalty should be
large enough to cause carriers to do everything
they can do to provide the promised service.
On the other hand, these options will involve
large vehicles traveling on public roads. Equip-
ment breakdowns and unforeseeable major
traffic situations can happen.  If a carrier has
taken reasonable and prudent efforts to provide
the capacity, but an unforeseeable incident
makes the carrier late, the penalties probably
should not be draconian.
Premium Services
Separate options should be sold for team and
single-driver service on a given lane.  As a
majority of cross-country loads are single-driver,
they will likely represent the majority of interest
in options.  With a single driver, Los Angeles to
Chicago takes four days versus only two for
team drivers.  However, teams cost 25% more
than single driver rate.  Some carriers may
decide to offer options that could be “upgraded”
to other services, like team drivers, or refriger-
ated loads.
MANAGING TRANSPORTATION
OPTIONS
For a company using transportation options, it
needs to be able to track and manage those
options, and be able to decide when to buy or
sell them.  The need for options by shippers,
carriers and 3PLs will be closely related to their
future transportation needs, so any tool for
managing options needs access to as much
information as possible about those future needs.
The most likely solution is for any Options
Management System (OMS) to be tightly linked
to the company’s transportation management
system (TMS), perhaps as a module of the TMS.
In the TMS, the OMS will have access to all of
the company’s existing future transportation
needs and plans. Shippers will want to track the
eventual shipments via their TMS, so obviously
a linkage between the OMS and the TMS will be
important.
Having estimates of future transportation needs
for upcoming peak shipping seasons would seem
a good way to maximize the benefits of using
options. However, many companies may not be
making plans very far into the future via their
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TMS, so some companies will need to expand
their abilities to forecast freight needs to maxi-
mize their benefits from options.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Transportation options could provide buyers and
sellers the opportunity to hedge transportation
capacity and cost.  As described above, options
can provide shippers, carriers and logistics
companies a significant opportunity to reduce
risks.
We believe that transportation options present an
opportunity for supply chain professionals to
gain significant advantage in managing supply
chain risk.  There are, however, numerous issues
that remain to be addressed.
Given that the recent credit crisis was exacer-
bated (if not caused) by the use of derivatives,
future developments in transportation options
must proceed carefully and earn the industry’s
trust that these will be a tool to help manage
risk, without creating an unforeseen set of new
risks for the industry.
Further clarification is needed as to how options
should be constructed and traded on an ex-
change.  There are different ways that options
could be traded and settled, and these issues
need to be decided.  More work is also needed to
investigate the role of transportation indexes in
pricing and settling options contracts.
As identified above, there are numerous areas
where buyers and sellers of options need to agree
on what the common terms of the options would
be. Transportation options need to be standard-
ized. The purpose of transportation options is to
reduce uncertainty about future shipments for
carriers, shippers, and third parties.  Options
must provide enough certainty about the timing
of the shipments in order to serve the needs of
the shippers, so they can rely on these shipments
to meet their needs. This standardization is
needed to allow options to be widely traded on
an exchange, so future work is needed to identify
more clearly what the “standard terms” of a
transportation option are likely to look like.
Once the terms of the options are more readily in
focus, work is needed to properly value the
options.  Because of their similarity to financial
and commodity options, it is likely that the
models and methodologies for valuing transpor-
tation options will borrow heavily from the
existing financial literature.
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